My RFE comments on “Islamic Radicalization” in Bosnia
Last Saturday (17 November 2007), Radio Free Europe (RFE) aired a story on “Islamic Radicalization – Reality or Fata Morgana?” (Islamska radikalizacija – stvarnost ili fatamorgana?), by Vlado Azinović and Maja Bjelajac. I was one of the people interviewed. Let me repeat what I said, and take the opportunity to qualify and expand on it a little.
U BiH djeluje selefijski pokret čije učenje ima znatan utjecaj. No, unutar tog pokreta postoje dvije skupine. Veća skupina uglavnom živi vrlo pobožno, a njezini su članovi zaokupljeni misionarskim radom i obrazovanjem. Druga i znatno manja skupina selefija je militantna, ali i sve više izolirana od ostatka ovoga pokreta.
(In Bosnia-Hercegovina there is a Salafi movement whose teaching has quite some influence. Within that movement, there are two groups. The larger group essentially leads a pious life, and its adherents engage in missionary work and education. Another and much smaller group is militant, but it is increasingly isolated from the rest of that movement.)
– Me to RFE
One could discuss whether Salafism has “considerable influence”. Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but the majority of practicing Muslims in Bosnia surely continue “being Muslim the Bosnian way” (in the words of Tone Bringa‘s title). But the least one can say is that various forms of more-or-less Salafi Islam have established themselves in Islamic publishing, education, and youth work, and that their influence is a subject of heated debate in the establishment Islamic Community organization. Also, analyzing the Salafi movement in Bosnia into two groups is admittedly an oversimplification. Perhaps three groups is closer to the point: a moderate, scholarly tendency already part of the establishment, a once-radical youth movement increasingly moderating itself to enjoy better relations with the establishment, and a radical remnant. One can subdivide further; within this radical remnant, there are splinter groups – handfuls of people in this or that village – that isolate themselves from everyone else. From a security viewpoint, the latter seem the most problematic. Anyway, for the purposes of the radio interview, I combined the first two groups into one.
Najveća opasnost ovoga pokreta leži u tome što ga se može predstavljati opasnijim nego što on uistinu jest i iskoristiti ga za dodatno zaoštravanje političke krize u i oko Bosne i Hercegovine.
(The greatest danger posed by this [Salafi] movement is that it may be presented as more dangerous than it actually is, and exploited to exacerbate the political crisis in and around Bosnia-Hercegovina.)
– Me to RFE
The remarks by Alibašić and Antunez in the same broadcast, I think, round out this point.
No, opasnost od nasilja se kao po pravilu veže uz pojavu svakog novog vjerskog pokreta. U ovom slučaju, napetosti postoje između mladih selefijskih aktivista i lokalnih zajednica u BiH koje su odane tradicionalnom prakticiranju islama.
(There is a risk of violence connected with the emergence of any new religious movement. In this case, there are tensions between young Salafi activists and local [mosque] communities in Bosnia that adhere to “traditional” Islamic practice.)
– Me to RFE
I may add that this violence is not necessarily in all cases initiated by the Salafis.
Što se tiče aspekta za koji su svi najviše zainteresirani – povezanosti s međunarodnim terorizmom, poznato je da se terorizam može pojaviti bilo gdje. Ne vidim razlog zbog kojega bismo vjerovali da Bosna i Hercegovina na tom planu predstavlja veću prijetnju nego neka druga europska zemlja. Bili smo svjedocima velikih terorističkih napada u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, Španjolskoj, Velikoj Britaniji i drugdje, dok se u BiH ništa ni približno tome nije dogodilo. Tek proljetos osuđen je prvi Bošnjak optužen za pripremu terorističkog napada. Međutim, on je švedski državljanin i odrastao je u Švedskoj, pa bi onda netko s podjednakim utemeljenjem mogao zaključiti da je teroristička prijetnja iz Skandinavije također sigurnosni problem za Bosnu.“
(As for the aspect that people are most interested in — ties to international terrorism — we know that terrorism can turn up anywhere. But I don’t see any reason why we should think that Bosnia-Hercegovina presents a greater threat in that regard than other European countries. We have seen large terrorist attacks in Spain, the UK, and elsewhere, but nothing like that has happened in Bosnia. It was only this spring that a Bosniak for the first time was convicted of plotting a terrorist attack. However, he was a Swedish citizen, grown up in Sweden [and radicalized there], so one might just as well conclude that the Scandinavian terrorist threat is a security problem for Bosnia.)
– Me to RFE
I was not saying this just to be cute. The talk about Bosnia and Islamic terrorism needs finally to be put in some comparative perspective. Arguably, Western Europe has been exporting more Islamic radical troublemakers to Bosnia than the other way around. Bosnia is unusual in that it attracted foreign mujahedin during the war, some of whom settled (but their presence has since been much reduced), and who inspired local youths who fought with them to adopt their ways (but see the above notes on developments in the Salafi movement). But this does not seem sufficient to account for the persistent discussions of Bosnia as sui generis a potential source of or base for terrorism. These discussions, I believe, owe much to political propaganda, to Western willingness to project a domestic problem onto the wild Balkans, and to the tacit assumption that a European country with a half Muslim population must be dangerous. To what I said, though, I should have added two other potential forms of potential local conflict:
- Between Salafis and non-practicing, secular Muslims, when the former try to impose Islamic rules e. g. on alcohol on the latter. There seems to be less of this about than in the wartime and immediate post-war period, though.
- Between militant Salafis and non-Muslims (Bosnian Serbs and Croats). There have been incidents of deadly violence, by radicalized Muslim groups or individuals, especially against Croats (the bombings of the Mostar gang that was tried in 1996, the killing of the Anđelović family in 2003). However, these conform to a pattern of small-scale domestic terrorism found on all three extreme sides of Bosnia’s nationalist divides that cannot be ascribed to Islamic radicalism alone.
The question, though, is whether a putative growth in the Salafi/Wahhabi presence exacerbates the risk of inter-ethnic violence. I don’t have a ready answer to that question, which goes to the heart of present debate. But this will depend on non-Salafi and non-Muslim reactions as well — and once again, Salafis can be victims as well as instigators of violence. Recent talk from analysts in Republika Srpska about a danger of “civil war” strikes me as irresponsible and disingenuous. But more on that, perhaps, some other time.